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post-Islamists. A text by Olivier Roy in Le Monde

Here are some excerpts from an article in Le Monde that in my opinion contains some good ideas to remove "the Western clichés to mask the profound changes in the Arab world." The translation is mine, and perhaps clumsy quick, so I appreciate any suggestions for improvement *.

The author, Olivier Roy, a professor of philosophy, director of research at the CNRS (National Centre for Scientific Research) in Paris, a research associate at the Center for Research and International Studies, Political Science, Program Director Mediterranean European University Institute in Florence and author of essays "Globalized Islam" (2002) and "The holy ignorance" (2008).

post-Islamist Revolutions
Olivier Roy. Le Monde, 13/02/1911
[article in French]

European public opinion plays the popular uprisings in northern Africa from a scheme of thirty years ago: the Islamic revolution in Iran. Consequently, expect to see Islamic movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and its local equivalents, the head of the movement or position of ambush, ready to take power. But discretion and pragmatism of the Muslim Brotherhood surprised and disturbed: Where are the Islamists?

If you look at those who launched the movement, it is clear that this is a post-Islamist generation. Large revolutionaries movements of the 70 and 80, for them is ancient history, that of their parents. This new generation is not interested in ideology, slogans are all pragmatic and concrete (go!) Do not appeal to Islam as their predecessors in Algeria in the late 80's. Expressed above all a rejection of corrupt dictatorships and a demand for democracy. This generation is pluralistic, no doubt because it is too individualistic. Are more informed and often have access to modern media, is fascinated not by Iran or Saudi Arabia. Those who protest in Egypt are precisely those who were demonstrating against Ahmadinejad in Iran. Maybe they are believers but separate this from their political demands, in this sense, the movement is "secular" and separating politics and religion. Religious practice is individualized.

(...) Democracy demands that today is not an imported product, unlike that promoted by Bush in 2003, it was not acceptable because it had no political legitimacy and was associated with an intervention military. Ironically, the weakening of the U.S. in the Middle East and pragmatism of the Obama administration have enabled indigenous demand for democracy is expressed with full legitimacy.

said that a riot does not make a revolution. The movement has no leaders, no political parties or structure, which is consistent with its nature but the problem of institutionalization of democracy. It is unlikely that the disappearance of the dictatorship necessarily entails the establishment of a liberal democracy (...). In Arab countries, the political landscape is complex, even more so because it was hidden by the dictatorship.

(...) Do Islamists? Have not disappeared but have changed. The most radical have left the scene to go to the international jihad, and are no longer here: they are in the desert with Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb, in Pakistan or in the suburbs of London. They have no social or political base. The international jihad is completely disconnected from social movements and national struggles.

Another optical illusion is associated with the re-Islamization mass societies seem to have crossed the Arab world during the past 30 years with a political radicalization. If Arab societies are more visibly Islamic 30 or 40 years ago what explains the absence of Islamic slogans in current events? It's the Paradox of Islamization: Islam has largely depoliticized. The re-Islamization social and cultural (the veil, the number of mosques, the multiplication of preachers, the religious television) has become apart of Islamist militants and has opened a religious market on which no one has a monopoly, also is in line with the new religious concerns of young people, which is individualistic but also changing. That is, the Islamists have lost their monopoly on religious discourse in the public space they had in the 80's.

On the one hand, dictatorships in general (but not in Tunisia) have favored a conservative Islam, visible but little political control freak traditions. (...) However paradoxical it may seem, the re-Islamization has led to a trivialization and a depoliticization of religious references: when everything is religious, nothing religious. What in the West is perceived as a big green wave of Islamization definitely not for more than a banal: everything becomes Islamic, from the fast-food to women's fashion.

(...) Another mistake is to conceive dictatorships as defenders of secularism against religious fanaticism. Authoritarian regimes have secularized societies, on the contrary, except in Tunisia, have brought with a re-Islamization neofundamentalism type, which speaks to implement the Sharia without question the nature of the state. Everywhere, the ulema [schools of theology] and official religious institutions have been domesticated by the State, retreating into a theological conservatism timid. So much so that traditional clerics, trained in Al-Azhar [the most prestigious university theology of Islam], and are not involved, nor the political issue, nor the great challenges facing society.

This trend has also affected the Islamist political movements, influenced by the Brothers Muslims and their followers (...). The Muslim Brotherhood has changed a lot. (...) They have understood to want to take power after a revolution leading to civil war or dictatorship. They have also learned the lessons of the Turkish model: Erdogan and the AKP have been able to reconcile democracy, electoral victory, economic development, national independence and the promotion of values, if not Islamic, at least for "authenticity." But above all, the Muslim Brotherhood are not carriers of other economic or social model. The gentrification of the Islamists is a favorable factor for democracy: the inability to play the card of the Islamic revolution pushes to conciliation, compromise and alliances with other political forces. Today the question is not whether or not dictatorships are the best defense against Islam. The Islamists have become players in the democratic game .(...)

One thing is clear: we're not in the Arab-Muslim exceptionalism. Current events reflect a profound transformation in Arab societies. These changes were under way for some time, but hidden behind the tenacious stereotypes that the West looks at the Middle East.

* I literally kept very French expressions such as "Maghreb" or "world Arabic ", which carry all the connotations of the colonial gaze, but precisely because it seems to me necessary to keep them. We must also take into account France's colonial history to understand that while sometimes referring to Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, the framework for discussion of this text are the countries of Arabic culture of North Africa and Middle East.

The poster of the photo is the documentary "Neukölln Unlimited" , led by Agostino Imondi and Dietmar Ratsch.